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Case Notes
Instream Values Find Harbor in Bean Lake III,
Drown in Prior Appropriation
Alex C. Sienkiewicz*
Few public interests are more obvious, indisputable and
independent of particular theory than the interest of the
public of a state to maintain the rivers that are wholly
within it substantially undiminished, except by such drafts
upon them as the guardian of the public welfare may per-
mit for the purpose of turning them to a more perfect
use... the private right to appropriate is subject not only to
the rights of lower owners but to the initial limitation that it
may not substantially diminish one of the great foundations
of public welfare and health.
-Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes:
Hudson County Water Co. v. McCarter (1908)'
PREFACE
In the twentieth century water withdrawals to offstream uses, including
farms, industry and homes, increased tenfold. Streamflows have dropped as
a result of such activities, while demand for instream water relating to rec-
2reation and water quality has increased. Montana's communities, human
and ecological, depend upon the water resource. This dependence should be
fully reflected in laws governing use of water resources. Montana water
law, which governs water use, is based on prior appropriation. This doctrine
grants permanent property rights to private water users.3 A water right
gives one legal standing to appropriate water for a particular use.4 Many
holders of water rights pay nothing for the water itself, while industrial
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scale participants in federal reclamation projects may pay a modest fee re-
flecting a considerable subsidy. Because the right to appropriate water is
transferable through sale or lease, it holds significant economic value.6
The volume in any particular body of water is finite. It is thus possible
that the entire volume of water in a river, stream or lake may be allocated to
appropriators at any given period in time, leaving none for non diversionary
public uses. Reallocation can occur as water rights are bought, sold and
leased. Such rights may also lapse due to non use or misuse by right hold-
ers.7 If a water right lapses, it then comes available for the next appropriator
in line. Western water rights are not based on ownership of land abutting a
source but rather, on the active appropriation and application of the water to
beneficial use.8 A water right may be retained so long as one appropriates
the specified volume of water and puts it to beneficial, non wasteful use.9
The waterways of Montana are too numerous to monitor continually. Thus,
in order to enforce volume allocations, appropriators often engage in self
enforcement or mutual coercion. Through these mechanisms, the water of
the state is meted out.
The prior appropriation doctrine grants priority to senior water right
holders: first in time, first in right. A senior water right holder is entitled to
appropriate a specified volume before junior right holders may appropriate.
This volume is based on a number of factors, including the use to which the
water will be put, effect on prior appropriators, whether or not there is un-
appropriated water within the source, and other factors relating to compet-
ing human uses for the water resource. 10 If a watercourse is fully allocated
to senior right holders, then junior holders must do without the resource. So
too must citizens who would make use of the water in situ for economic,
recreational or other purposes. If non appropriating citizens must forego use
of an over subscribed stock of water, it follows that fish, wildlife and eco-
logical communities are likely to lose the resource as well.
I. INTRODUCTION
In 2002, the Supreme Court of Montana published the Bean Lake III
opinion (In re the Adjudication of the Existing Water Rights to the Use of
All the Water, Both Surface and Underground, within the Missouri River
Drainage Area, Including All Tributaries of the Missouri River in Broad-
5. Bates, supra n. 3, at 134.
6. Wolfe, supra n. 3, at 113.
7. Water rights may lapse if they are not used, or if the use is determined by the Montana District
Court (including the Water Court)/Department of Natural Resources and Conservation (DNRC) to be
non-beneficial. Id. at 49.
8. Id. at 147.
9. Water right specifications such as allowable volume vary with supply and demand and are
determined by the Montana District Court (including the Water Court) and the Department of Natural
Resources and Conservation). Id. at 112-113.
10. Id. at H12-13.
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water, Cascade, Jefferson and Lewis and Clark Counties, Montana (Basin
411)). 11 Bean Lake III takes steps to mitigate an imprecise body of jurispru-
dence by establishing fish, wildlife and recreation based uses as beneficial;
while also holding that diversion of water is not a required element of bene-
ficial use. Although Bean Lake III grants ecological values standing to
compete with consumptive uses, the holding is merely permissive and will
not soon change wasteful patterns of water extraction for extraction's sake.
The case is thus a common law quick fix to one of many negative side ef-
fects of the prior appropriation doctrine.
Although Bean Lake clarifies beneficial use and appropriation, the hold-
ing establishes no affirmative incentives for water appropriators to conserve
the resource, which is extracted to the detriment of ecological, recreational
and associated market and non market values.
Montana jurisprudence, in the line of cases leading up to Bean Lake III,
addressed ambiguously the legal notions of beneficial use and appropria-
tion.12 Bean Lake III qualifies the prior appropriation doctrine by holding
that: 1) instream, non diversionary appropriations for fish and wildlife con-
stitute a beneficial use 2) appropriation does not necessitate diversion of
water from its source and 3) the Montana Water Court's comments inserted
into five Department of Fish, Wildlife and Parks water right claims were
issue statements as opposed to adoptions of formal policy positions. 3 Bean
Lake III thus grants public resource management agencies or other stake-
holders desiring to reserve instream flows equal standing to compete for
water rights with miners, ranchers, hydroelectric operations and other tradi-
tional appropriators of water. The holding lacks force where conservation is
concerned, however, as most extant water rights will remain extractive in
nature. 14 Furthermore, any new appropriations for instream uses will remain
inferior to existing extractive rights. It would be naive to expect a signifi-
cant proportion of water right holders to act in the interest of ecological and
public values by leaving water to its natural course when the common law
has heretofore been unclear as to the legal and administrative ramifications
of doing so.
As noted, water rights hold a tangible market value, a value that is for-
feited when the resource is not put to beneficial use. Because Montana ju-
risprudence previously conveyed mixed messages as to whether leaving
water instream constituted a beneficial use, appropriators' primary incen-
tive was to protect their rights by simply extracting their allocated water
11. In re the Adjudication of the Existing Water Rights to the Use of All the water, Both Surface
and Underground, within the Missouri River Drainage Area, Including All Tributaries of the Missouri
River in Broadwater, Cascade, Jefferson and Lewis and Clark Counties, Montana (Basin 411), 55 P.3d
396 (Mont. 2002) [hereinafter Bean Lake III].
12. Id. at 399
13. Id. at 407-408
14. Telephone interview with Bruce Farling, Executive Director, Montana Trout Unlimited (Janu-
ary 30, 2004).
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whenever possible, as doing so more closely resembled a beneficial use
under the prior appropriation doctrine. Should the conservation oriented
water right holder choose to change from an extractive to an instream use
he would, furthermore, be required to endure some measure of administra-
tive process. In essence, a system historically based upon sustained extrac-
tion will not soon be altered by a common law decision that qualifies bene-
ficial use and merely permits a conservation friendly alternative. While
clarification (of beneficial use and diversion) was overdue, Bean Lake III
relegates to token status the notion that the law should actively deter waste-
ful extraction of water from the public domain. The case suggests that if
public natural resource management agencies sought instream rights in a
volume tantamount to senior appropriators' extractive rights, then natural
flow regimes might perhaps approach half of their natural levels in any
given year.
In Montana, one must obtain a permit in order to draw water from its
natural repositories. The permitting system is coupled with traditional no-
tions of prior appropriation. New permit applicants must wait their turn
behind senior water right holders until water comes available for use. While
thousands of private citizens and business entities enter this process to ap-
propriate water, few enter the process on behalf of instream values. There
exist only a few natural resource management agencies in Montana. Their
non diversionary claims for instream/habitat purposes comprise 0.35 %
(35/100' hS of a percent) of all appropriations in the state.' 5 The Bean Lake
III case revived only 26 claims for instream flow reservations out of
206,000 extant claims. 16 These 26 claims were non diversionary and thus
might have been construed as invalid under the late confusion surrounding
beneficial use. Nonetheless, appropriations for ecological values are now
and will likely remain an insignificant minority. Because Bean Lake III
lacks statutory reinforcement, there exists little incentive for appropriators
to follow its lead by leaving unneeded water to its natural course.
The prior(ity) appropriation doctrine, even post Bean Lake III, ignores
the stark economic, social, political and ecological differences between the
American West of the nineteenth century and that of today.1 7 The purport-
edly flexible doctrine has yet to fully adapt to the economic, social and eco-
logical realities of the New West. While Bean Lake III grants Montana's
public resource management agencies equal standing to compete for water
with extant appropriators, the case stands within the anachronistic confines
of the prior appropriation doctrine. The prior appropriation doctrine does
not address the degree to which holders of water rights are subsidized in
their consumption by the non appropriating public. The prior appropriation
15. Stan Bradshaw & Laura Zehmer, Bean Lake Explained, Montana Trout Unlimited 1 (2003).
16. Id.
17. Terry L. Anderson & Donald R. Leal, Free Market Environmentalism, 91 (Palgrave 2001).
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doctrine continues to reward those who (or whose progenitors) have capital-
ized on a public resource first.
Unless one believes that water holds no value-market, intrinsic or oth-
erwise-the institution of prior appropriation fails to reflect water's true
value, and hence, the external costs associated with its diversionary use.
Those acquiring appropriation rights receive a public resource at little or no
cost: "shut[ting] out large segments of the population, and with them, a set
of ideals about how water should be used."' 8 The true costs of this appro-
priated resource are not reflected in the marketplace when water rights are
(& were) allocated. These costs include diminished quality of life, sullied
environments, fractured ecosystems as well as accompanying economic and
social losses. Granting water appropriators an inherently valuable public
good at zero cost is akin to social welfare for people who are neither job-
less, nor homeless nor handicapped. 19 Bean Lake III represents a step for-
ward within the scheme of prior appropriation, but does not remedy critical,
anachronistic aspects of the prior appropriation doctrine.
II. FACTS
Bean Lake III came to fruition primarily due to tensions between the
Montana Department of Fish, Wildlife and Parks (DFWP) and the Montana
Water Court (though amicus curiae were numerous). In Bean Lake III,
DFWP successfully appealed a Water Court ruling that denied five pre
1973 water right claims within the Missouri River Basin.2° In response to
DFWP's appeal, the Water Court urged the Montana Supreme Court to
dismiss the appeal on a procedural flaw or in the alternative, to convert it to
a petition for supervisory control. 21 The Montana Supreme Court chose the
22latter alternative. In Bean Lake III DFWP asserted that the beneficial use
to which they would put the water under claim was that of fish, wildlife and
recreation. However 14 years prior to Bean Lake III, the Water Court's In
re Dearborn Drainage Area decision (hereinafter Bean Lake I), denied
DFWP similar claims based on fish, wildlife and recreation because these
claims were non diversionary.23
On dismissing the Montana Stockgrowers Association's request for at-
torneys fees from Bean lake I, the Montana Supreme Court upheld the Wa-
ter Court's denial of fish, wildlife and recreation based claims (hereinafter:
18. Bates, supra n. 3, at 7.
19. Id. at 134.
20. Bean Lake 111, 55 P.3d at 398, 407.
21. Id. at 398.
22. Id.
23. In re the Adjudication of the Existing Water Rights to the Use of All the water, Both Surface
and Underground, within the Dearborn Drainage Area, Including All Tributaries of the Missouri River
in Cascade and Lewis and Clark Counties, Montana, 766 P.2d 228, 230 (Mont. 1988) [hereinafter Bean
Lake 1].
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Bean Lake 11).24 Thus, in addressing the pivotal issues of what constitutes a
beneficial use and whether diversion of water from its source is a necessary
element of beneficial use (i.e., a valid appropriation), the Bean Lake III
Court sought clarification of a seemingly contradictory body of jurispru-
dence. In assuming supervisory control of Bean Lake III, the Montana Su-
preme Court requested and received several amicus curiae briefs, including
submissions from the United States, the Montana Stockgrowers Associa-
tion, and the Montana State Council of Trout Unlimited.25
The contrasting views manifest in Bean Lake III illustrate jurisprudential
ambiguities in the common law. In Bean lake III, DFWP attempted to work
within then current jurisprudence by basing its fish, wildlife and recreation
based water claims on the prior appropriation doctrine's traditional re-
quirement of diversion. That is, they proposed transfer of water from its
source to another location. This was consistent with the Bean Lake I ruling
which held that diversion or capture was an essential element of beneficial
use.26 Despite the fact that DFWP's claim in Bean Lake III met the diver-
sionary requirement, the Water Court had focused on the ecological and
recreational impetus for the claims in its denial, apparently minimizing the
significance of diversion.27 In doing so, the court sidestepped the issue of
diversion completely. Emphasizing this view, the Water Court consistently
inserted into abstracts addressing DFWP's claims a remark (hereinafter:
"Bean Lake Remark") stating:
There is a question as to the validity of this claimed right.
[In] In [re] the Dearborn Drainage Area.... the Montana
Supreme Court stated: "It is clear therefore that under
Montana law before 1973, no appropriation right was rec-
ognized for recreation, fish and wildlife, except through a
Murphy right statute.28
DFWP repeatedly objected to the Bean Lake Remark, requesting its re-
moval from the Water Court's briefs. The Water Court, in response, consis-
tently refused to remove the remark from its documents.29 In addition to
objecting to the Bean Lake Remark, DFWP asserted that their 5 pre 1973
claims constituted beneficial uses and by extension, that all fish, wildlife
24. In the Matter of the Adjudication of the existing rights to the use of all the water, both Surface
and Underground within the Dearborn Drainage Area, including all tributaries of the Dearborn River
in Cascade and Lewis and Clark Counties, Montana, 782 P.2d 898 (Mont. 1989) [hereinafter Bean Lake
Ill.
25. Bean Lake 11, 55 P.3d at 397.
26. Bean Lake 1, 766 P.2d at 236.
27. Bean Lake 111, 55 P.3d at 397-398.
28. Id. at 398. Murphy right statutes are described as follows: "The 1969 Montana Legislature
created a procedure by which the Fish and Game Commission could appropriate instream flows for fish,
wildlife and recreation purposes on certain designated streams. Section 89-801, RCM (1947)." Id. at n.
1,399.
29. Id. at 398-399.
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and recreation related uses entailing diversion were valid under pre 1973
law. 30 The Bean Lake Remark and the Water Court's denial of diversionary
fish, wildlife and recreation based claims prompted DFWP's appeal of that
decision. These events punctuated the ambiguity and confusion surrounding
the concepts of beneficial use and diversion, to which the Montana Su-
preme Court had contributed by upholding the Water Court's ruling in Bean
Lake I.
IIl. ARGUMENTS OF PARTIES
The Montana Water Court, in its Bean Lake III denial of DFWP's claims,
asserted that the Bean Lake Remark was merely an issue statement, and did
not constitute a formal policy stance adopted by the Water Court.31 Fur-
thermore, the Water Court argued that DFWP's appeal to the Montana Su-
preme Court should be denied for failing to comply with deadlines deline-
ated by claims examination rules.32 The Water Court also suggested that its
denial of DFWP's claims was consistent with Bean Lake I:
[The] Supreme Court's Bean Lake decision did, in fact,
conclude that pre July 1973 Montana water law does not
recognize diverted rights for recreation, fish and wildlife.33
Beyond its arguments regarding claims examination rules and precedent
set by Bean Lake I, the Water Court's alternative pleading perhaps bespeaks
confusion regarding the fundamental issues of beneficial use and diversion.
The Montana Supreme Court itself acknowledged that Bean Lake I is "no
model of clarity., 34 While the Montana Supreme Court acknowledged the
Water Court's valid argument as to claims examination rules, Justice
Leaphart's majority opinion harkens back to Bean Lake I, noting the impor-
tance of sorting out the complex issues at hand for the sake of resolving
confusion, promoting judicial economy and the efficient process of water
claims.35
Implicit in the Montana Supreme Court's accepting supervisory control
is a sense of accountability in their ill considered affirmation of the Water
Court's ruling in Bean Lake I (with Bean Lake 1/). 36 Bean Lake III thus
sought clarification and remediation of the Supreme Court's erroneous
holding in Bean Lake I. While the prior appropriation doctrine has been in
place for more than 125 years, all parties would likely concur that in the
past few decades Montana jurisprudence has not reconciled societal values
30. Id. at 397.
31. Id. at 398-399.
32. Id. at 398.
33. Br. of Respt., 27, Bean Lake 111, 55 P.3d 396 (2002).
34. Bean Lake II1, 55 P.3d at 400.
35. Id. at 398.
36. Id.
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relating to fish, wildlife and recreation with the customary values of min-
ing, stock watering, agriculture and other traditional appropriations around
which the doctrine originally developed. 7
A. Majority Reasoning
In Bean Lake III the Montana Supreme Court held erroneous the Bean
Lake I ruling that under Montana law no appropriation right was recognized
for recreation, fish and wildlife except through Murphy right appropria-
tions.3 In justifying this decision, the Court looked to the historical context
of the prior appropriation doctrine, noting that it grew out of a culture of
mining and westward expansion.39 The common law elements of valid ap-
propriation are: intent, notice, diversion and application to beneficial use.4°
Montana however, "in accordance with the flexibility of the prior appro-
priation doctrine," grants water rights primarily on the basis of application
to a beneficial use. 41 The Court's majority opinion notes that beneficial use
is the "touchstone of the prior appropriation doctrine. 4 2
The Montana Supreme Court noted that Bean Lake I, in its holding that
no appropriation right was recognized for fish, wildlife and recreation, was
incompatible with the precedent on which it was based. In particular the
Court cited the Montana cases: Osnes Livestock Co. v. Warren (1936) and
Paradise Rainbows v. Fish and Game Commission (1966). 43 The Bean Lake
III Court asserted that the Bean Lake I Court had altogether ignored Osnes
and misread Paradise Rainbows.44
In addressing the touchstone issues of beneficial use and diversion, the
Osnes Court held that a senior water right claim, even if based on a recrea-
tional/fish and wildlife related use, such as a fish pond or swimming pool,
would have priority over a subsequent, valid water right claim. 45 Nonethe-
less, the Bean Lake I Court failed to address Osnes.46 Like Osnes, the Para-
dise Rainbows Court reinforced recreational and ecological applications,
such as fish ponds, as valid and beneficial uses. The Paradise Rainbows
decision upheld such beneficial uses so long as they were diversionary. The
Bean Lake III Court thus asserted that the Water Court erroneously over-
looked directly analogous precedent relating to diversionary claims based
on fish, wildlife and recreation when it denied DFWP's 5 pre 1973 claims.47
37. Id. at 399.
38. Id. at 400. For information regarding Murphy right appropriations, see supra, n. 27.
39. Id. at 399.
40. Id.
41. Id.
42. Id.
43. Osnes Livestock Co. v. Warren, 62 P.2d 206 (Mont. 1936); Paradise Rainbows v. Fish and
Game Commission, 421 P.2d 717 (Mont. 1966).
44. Bean Lake I1, 55 P.3d at 399.
45. Osnes, 62 P.2d at 214.
46. 55 P.3d at 399.
47. Id. at 400.
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The Bean Lake III Court further noted the Montana Constitution's ex-
plicit recognition of recreation as a beneficial use.48 "The majority of briefs
submitted in [Bean Lake III] concur that the Bean Lake [I] decision is
fraught with inconsistencies." To this effect, the Bean Lake I Court ac-
knowledged that:
Article IX, Section 3, of the 1972 Montana Constitution
recognized recreation as a beneficial use and accepted 'as
given that the activities of DFWP in stocking Bean Lake
[and] maintaining the fishery resource[...] coupled with the
general public use of Bean Lake for the purpose of recrea-
tion, wildlife and fishing constituted a beneficial use of the
waters within the meaning of the prior appropriation doc-
trine.'
4 9
Curiously, the tenor of this language excerpted from the Bean Lake I
opinion directly undermines that Court's holding which states:
It is clear therefore that under Montana Law before 1973,
no appropriation right was recognized for recreation, fish
and wildlife except through a Murphy right statute.5 °
Such ambiguity contributed to the tensions pervading the Bean Lake III
case. Based on the contradictory language in Bean Lake I, the Bean Lake III
Court was unable to determine the basis for denial of DFWP's water claims
in Bean Lake I. The decision lacked sufficient analysis of appropriation.
Rather, reasoned the Bean Lake III Court, Bean Lake I focused on the erro-
neous presumption that Montana did not recognize fish, wildlife and recrea-
tion as beneficial uses (prior to 1973). The Bean Lake I decision was thus
unclear as to whether DFWP's claims were denied because of their non
diversionary nature or for reasons relating to the other common law ele-
ments of appropriation such as intent, notice or application to beneficial
use.
51
The Montana Supreme Court in its Bean Lake III decision recognized
fish, wildlife and recreation as beneficial uses of the water resource. With
regard to the Bean Lake I Court's ambiguity as to whether or not diversion
of water from its source is a requisite element of beneficial use, the Court
issued a pithy summation of its reasoning:
Common sense rebels against a rigid diversion requirement
that would refuse to recognize an acknowledged beneficial
use simply because application to the use does not require
48. Id.
49. Id. (citing Bean Lake 1, 766 P.2d at 234, 236).
50. 766 P.2d at 236.
51. 55P.3dat401.
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removal from and depletion of the water source. In accor-
dance with the [prior appropriation] doctrine's flexibility,
we find that diversion is not a physical necessity of applica-
tion to a beneficial use.52
Diversion, reasoned the Court had been used in prior cases to prove intent,
a requisite element of appropriation. Nevertheless, while diversion is suffi-
cient to prove intent, it is not necessary to divert in order to show intent.53
In response to the dissent's assertion that addressing non diversionary
claims exceeded germane issues, the majority defended its elucidation by
noting that the issue of diversion was the crux of the confusion engendered
by Bean Lake 1.54 Diversion, therefore lay at the heart of the claims underly-
ing both Bean Lake cases.
B. Dissent Reasoning
The dissent concurred with the majority opinion to the degree that Bean
Lake I stated erroneously that recreation does not constitute a beneficial use
under the prior appropriation doctrine. Thus, the Court unanimously agreed
that the Bean Lake I Court's invalidation of all pre 1973 recreation, fish and
wildlife based claims (even those satisfying all elements of the prior appro-
priation doctrine) was erroneous. The divergence of opinion between the
majority and the dissent related to the concept of diversion or capture.55
Although the dissent concurred with the majority on the pre 1973 claims,
it disagreed on the issue of diversion. The two vote dissent also rejected the
five vote majority's assertion that the prior appropriation doctrine has his-
torically been flexible. To illustrate this point, the dissent explained that the
prior appropriation doctrine developed around custom, principally that of
miners and settlers of the late nineteenth century. In citing Murray v.
Tingley (1897), the dissent noted that diverting water from a stream by dig-
ging a ditch or otherwise tapping the stream constituted a valid appropria-
tion of water.56 Further, the dissent cited other cases (from 1900, 1912 and
1922) illustrative of early mining custom and the historic requirement of
diversion. 7 In citing pre statehood territorial statutes specifying application
of "the customs of early settlers," the dissent iterated the notion that diver-
sion has historically been a requirement."58 While it did not cite exclusively
to antiquated decisions, the dissent did argue that the methods by which
water could be appropriated have remained essentially unchanged since
52. Id.
53. ld. at 402.
54. ld. at401.
55. Id. at 408 (Rice, J. & Gray, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
56. Id. at 409 (Rice, J. & Gray, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
57. Id. at 409-411 (Rice, J. & Gray, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (see: Toohey v.
Campbell, 24 Mont. 13, 60 P. 396 (1900); Bailey v. Tintinger, 45 Mont. 154, 122 P. 575 (1912)).
58. Id. at 409-410 (Rice, J. & Gray, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
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1885.59 The dissent reasoned that more recent precedent thus adheres to the
same strict construction of appropriation established by the mining customs
of the nineteenth century.60 Further, the dissent claimed that "the Court in
large part ignores our century old statutory scheme requiring diversion,
preferring instead to focus on our common law history."'6 A long history of
cases was thus evoked, applying the settler-miners' customs to the eco-
nomic and social institutions of the present.
V. ANALYSIS
The whole system is wrong. It is wrong in principle as well
as faulty in procedure. It assumes that the establishment of
titles to snows on the mountains and the rain falling on
public land and the water collected in lakes and rivers, on
the use of which the development of the State must in great
measure depend, is a private matter. It ignores public in-
terests in a resource upon which the enduring prosperity of
communities must rest. It is like A suing B for control of
property which belongs to C. Many able attorneys hold that
these decreed rights will in time be held invalid because
when they were established the public, the real owner of
the property, did not have its day in court.
-Elwood Mead: Irrigation Institutions
62
Sound reasoning undergirds Bean Lake III. The holding makes sense
legally and intuitively, but falls short of accounting for the innumerable
ecological, economic and social losses (past, present and future) suffered
under the Wild West's decrepit prior appropriation doctrine. The conflict
generated by the case was misspent energy and belies the real world futility
of the Bean Lake III decision in the New West. Were it backed by carefully
crafted statutes designed to extirpate wasteful practices and accommodate
true beneficial uses, then Bean Lake III would perhaps ameliorate some
injuries inflicted by prior appropriation. At present, however, any incentive
to conserve water, habitat, species and associated socioeconomic values is
de minimis. Within a vast arid landscape in which water is akin to the
doomed pasture of Hardin's Tragedy of the Commons, 63 those fortunate
enough to hold appropriation rights (i.e., access) will do as rational self
interest and the prior appropriation doctrine would have them do. They will
extract the resource until public waterways and the amenities they support
have gone the way of Hardin's open access pasture - and the westslope
59. Id. at 410-411 (Rice, J. & Gray, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
60. Id. at 410-412 (Rice, J. & Gray, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
61. Id. at 411-412 (Rice, J. & Gray, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
62. Bates, supra n. 3, at 144.
63. See: Garrett Hardin, Tragedy of the Commons, 162 Science: 1243-1248 (1968).
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cutthroat trout. 64 Though western water is not a tragedy of the commons in
the strict economic sense, the same ilk of externalities - those benefiting a
few while burdening the public - abound.65
While sluicing and dredging for valuable minerals or clearing native
vegetation from forest, prairie or desert for agriculture may once have com-
prised the highest uses of the land, change continues to act upon western
landscape. Once plentiful resources are now scarce and once scarce re-
source users are now plentiful. The social, economic, and ecological state of
the West has changed much during the past 150 years. Dubious is a present
day determination of beneficial use that is derived from customs of the
"[18149ers" digging for gold in the hills.
Bean Lake III mitigates some flaws of the prior appropriation doctrine by
establishing recreation, fish and wildlife values as beneficial uses independ-
ent of whether or not water is being diverted from a source. This common
sense clarification was overdue and (hypothetically) allows agencies acting
in the public interest to reserve water instream to serve recreational and
ecological functions. Notably, the decision does not grant non diversionary
recreational and ecological values any degree of seniority within the prior
appropriation system, but merely imparts equal standing to compete for
water rights with other would be appropriators. In this respect the decision
bolsters first in time, first in right aspects of the prior appropriation doc-trine.66
Under Bean Lake III, fisheries and their associated recreational and eco-
logical applications represent a beneficial use. This signifies a progressive
development as it perhaps accounts for the vast quantities of time and
money recreators and all manner of citizen spend pursuing their interests on
public waterways. Perhaps the holding also accounts for the myriad values
Montana's citizens ascribe to wildlife and habitat.67 In these ways, Bean
Lake III more closely accounts for the true value of the New West's water.
Prior to this ruling, it was unclear whether public agencies desiring to re-
serve water in situ were able to compete with traditional appropriators for
rights to use water where it naturally occurred.
Instream reservations are of great value, economic and otherwise. Many
citizens ascribe to intact waterways and ecosystems intrinsic value; the
mere existence of the intact resource is important to people, even if one
64. See: Michael K. Young, Technical Editor, Conservation Assessment for Inland Cutthroat
Trout, USDA Forest Service General Technical Report RM-GTR-256, (Fort Collins, Colo. 1995).
65. See: Hardin, supra n. 63.
66. In effect, for agencies to establish new instream allocations to benefit the public, they would
need to purchase water rights from senior appropriators. Senior appropriators may have received those
water rights at zero cost.
67. Ascriptions of value to wildlife and habitat likely transcend political divisions. Some value
habitat for the game it provides to hunt, some for the economic benefits it brings, some for resources to
be extracted or harvested, some for its mere existence, some for spiritual reasons, some for the opportu-
nity to be enjoyed by subsequent generations of humans, some for aesthetics, some for biodiversity
refuge... and so on.
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gleans no tangible benefit. Intrinsic values underlie such preferences as
those for the preservation of distant landscapes and species considered ex-
otic to North Americans. 68 Montana's water markets, however, do not ac-
count for such values. Importantly, the shortage of those water rights secur-
ing instream flows on water courses does not equate to permission from
Montana's citizens to subsidize private interests in their use of an inherently
public resource. More likely, the dearth of non extractive reservations
evinces a belief that policy making institutions would successfully protect
public riparian and aquatic resources from depletion and misuse. Within the
prior appropriation scheme, this is an overly optimistic assumption.
The meting out of western water rights has long ignored in situ recrea-
tional and ecological values. Historically, water allocation has also ignored
the citizens who hold intrinsic value in a flowing river or intact fishery. As
Mead suggested, the non appropriating public never had its day in court,
and was not granted equal standing to compete with traditional appropria-
tors for water rights until the Bean Lake III decision was issued.69
Although Bean Lake III grants standing to the public (through govern-
ment agencies) to compete with traditional appropriators for water, it fails
to hold private appropriators accountable for the negative side effects (ex-
ternalities/external costs) of their consumption. Negative externalities rep-
resent those costs imposed, but not borne by the parties to a transaction. To
this effect, when an irrigator or cattle operation appropriates water for per-
sonal economic endeavors, they perforce remove water from an ecological
community. Consequently, ecologies and associated recreational opportuni-
ties may suffer. This, in turn, may harm quality of life for some or many.
More tangibly, diversion of water from its natural course can prove detri-
mental to economies based in fisheries, wildlife and outdoor recreation. 70
The question of whether appropriators should pay for side effects of their
appropriation is complex. Appropriators should, however, pay a price ap-
proaching the true cost of the water they appropriate, at least with respect to
its value to other would be users. In this critical respect, Bean Lake III falls
68. For example: that of Congress to preserve the Arctic National Wildlife Refuge as an intact
ecosystem. Intrinsic values also underlie contributions made by individuals to distant causes, such as
funds to preserve the Siberian Tiger or Black Rhino. While a Montanan may never make it to Alaska,
Siberia or Africa, the natural resources of such places may hold great intrinsic value. This is evidenced
by the tremendous sums received by nonprofit conservation organizations such as the World Wildlife
Fund. See: Gardner Brown & David F. Layton: A Market Solution for Preserving Biodiversity: The
Black Rhino in Endangered Species Protection in the United States. Biological Needs, Political Reali-
ties, Economic Choices (Cambridge University Press, 2002).
69. Bates, supra n. 3, at 144.
70. Fisheries problems illustrate well the negative externalities/external costs of oversubscription
of water stocks. Many species require clean, cold flows to thrive. When right holders remove water from
watercourses, aquatic ecosystems suffer. Reduced flows concentrate pollutants. When water is diverted,
habitat is likely degraded and diminished. Aquatic species are thus affected. See Jessica Koteen, et. Al.,
Evaluating Benefits and Costs of Changing Water Quality, USDA Forest Service General Technical
Report PNW-GTR-548 (Portland, OR 2002).
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short of making significant improvements to western water law. The prior
appropriation doctrine's fundamental flaws relating to external costs will be
mitigated only by law and policy that takes an affirmative approach.
Economic theory holds that competition for (what is essentially) a scarce
resource would determine a price for water in equilibrium with its supply.
In the case of the West, this price should be quite high (much greater than
zero) given the demand and myriad uses/values of water. It is thus perverse
that water rights have been allocated free of charge to senior appropriators,
who may extract the resource regularly - free of charge. The supply of fresh
water in the West (or perhaps the supply of people) is not the panacea it
was when prior appropriation doctrine was developed in the 1800s. Mil-
lions of western inhabitants are among competitors for divergent uses of a
limited supply of water, not least of which are uses related to instream val-
ues. The prior appropriation doctrine's zero cost handouts prevent the mar-
ket's invisible hand from reaching an equilibrium whereby there is real
incentive for senior appropriators to conserve, to use only that which one's
financial means allow. Thus arises the great resistance exerted by a subsi-
dized class whose subsidy might be rescinded, whose subsidy has morphed
into an entitlement. Such subsidy, and its aggressive defense by traditional
beneficiaries, ignores the deleterious side effects suffered by the non appro-
priating, subsidizing public. Thus, Bean Lake III, in spite of its auspices,
does not remove the subsidies inherent in prior appropriation.
The present endangered and threatened listings as well as extirpated ana-
dromous fisheries comprise prominent negative externalities arising (at
least in part) from the oversubscription of water stocks. Those who appro-
priate water help generate these external costs. Such costs, however, are
borne primarily by non appropriators. An efficient system would have wa-
ter appropriators paying for water a price reflecting the supply of water,
demand for water, opportunity cost, externalities and other such factors
excluded by the prior appropriation doctrine. Thus, water would not be free
to the first in time, but would be sold at a price approaching its true cost.
Proceeds might then be used to allocate water resources for in situ, non
diversionary values or for those values deemed most appropriate by the
public.
Prior to the recognition of recreation and ecological values as a beneficial
uses, many anadromous salmonid stocks were extirpated from the Rocky
Mountain West.71 Appropriations of finite stocks of water for other uses,
including hydroelectricity production, agriculture and mining, were causal
factors in the destruction of many Rocky Mountain salmon and steelhead
7 1. Many instream/ecological values have deteriorated. Prominent among these are suffering
salmonid species. Greenback cutthroat, westslope cutthroat, bull trout and other species are presently
endangered or threatened due to habitat degradation and loss. See Michael K. Young, Technical Editor,
Conservation Assessment for Inland Cutthroat Trout, USDA Forest Service General Technical Report
RM-GTR-256, (Fort Collins, Colo. 1995).
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runs. In Montana, existing fisheries such as those of the bull trout, Yellow-
stone and westslope cutthroat trout and that of the arctic grayling are listed
as endangered or as species of special concern. 2 These species declines are
symptomatic of the short shrift paid to instream values under contemporary
water law. Until instream values are granted serious consideration, such
ecological degradation will continue.
Of particular interest to Montana is the $300 million annual income gen-
erated by recreational angling in this state alone.73 It would thus prove inef-
ficient to deprive recreation and ecology based water appropriations equal
standing to compete with traditional appropriations. Arguably, such eco-
nomic benefits warrant reconsideration of the first in time, first in right ba-
sis of the prior appropriation doctrine in Montana. The prior appropriation
based water "market" is flawed not simply because it has traditionally ig-
nored non market/extrinsic values and negative externalities, but because it
does not distinguish with regard to the myriad beneficial uses of water. It
thus fails to account for public values and the inherent public nature of the
resource.
V. CONCLUSION
Water, as a necessary and common medium for community
development at every stage of society, has been held sub-
ject to perceived societal necessities of the time and cir-
cumstances. In that sense water's capacity for full privati-
zation has always been limited. The very terminology of
water law reveals that limitation: such terms as beneficial,
non-wasteful, navigation, servitude, and public trust all
impart an irreducible public claim on water as a public re-
source, and not merely a private commodity.
-Joseph Sax
74
Bean Lake III lacks the power to generate significant change. At its es-
sence Bean Lake III, by recognizing non diversionary fish, wildlife and
recreation based values, speaks to the inherently public nature of water.
This recognition is logical, but incomplete. The tensions within the case
underlie the historic application of private property rights to a resource that
is public in nature. Though the decision moves to grant public values equal
standing to compete for water with private interests, it highlights profound
72. Montana Fish, Wildlife and Parks Commission, Fishing Regulations 2002-2003 1 (Mont.
2002).
73. Montana Whirling Disease Task Force, Report and Action Recommendations, 11 (May 1999).
(available at <http://www.whirlingdisease.org/docs/wdtfreport.pdf>); The Montana Standard, Montana
Forum, (Jan. 30, 2003) (available at <http://www.montanaforum.com/rednews/2002/l0/30/build/
rivers/waterguest.php?nnn=5>).
74. Bates, supra n. 3 at 149.
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flaws within the prior appropriation doctrine. While Bean Lake III ensures
that the law will not rescind a water right because a holder chooses to apply
his rights to instream or conservation related values, it provides no affirma-
tive incentive to conserve. Still driving consumption of water is the use it or
lose it psychology which drains public streams, rivers and lakes to the det-
riment of ecological and human communities alike.
Prior appropriation is anachronism. Both the Bean Lake III majority and
the dissent acknowledge this through the precedent upon which they rely.
Prior appropriation is based in a frontier society, economy and ecology. The
policies of first in time and diversion served their purpose prior to the mod-
em era. They encouraged development of arid, unpopulated regions and
coupled well with homesteading policies of hasty land distribution. Today,
prior appropriation is improper. It generates profound external costs to be
borne by the general populous at the hands of private gain. While in the
abstract private gain is auspicious; that which burdens the public with nega-
tive externalities is not.
Bean Lake III moves toward acknowledging public values of fish, wild-
life and recreation, but the decision works within an obsolete framework.
The prior appropriation doctrine should be replaced with a market/policy
combination that attaches to the water resource the true costs of its appro-
priation as well as the public value it represents. Here, it is the govern-
ment's role to make our water markets more efficient through policy de-
signed to internalize the external costs associated with appropriation of the
water resource.
[Vol. 25
